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In today’s global economy, supply chain (SC) entities have become increasingly interconnected with demand and 
supply relationships due to the need for strategic outsourcing. Such interdependence among firms not only increases 
efficiency, but also creates more vulnerabilities in the system. Natural and human-made disasters such as floods and 
transport accidents may halt operations and lead to tremendous economic losses. Due to the interdependence among 
firms, the adverse effects of any disruption can be amplified and spread throughout the systems. This paper aims at 
understanding the systemic behaviors of SC systems against cascading failures. Considering the upper and lower 
bound load constraints, i.e., surplus inventory and cost, we examine the fraction of failed entities under load decrease 
and load fluctuation scenarios through numerical simulations. We also provide analytic results through mean-field 
theory. Results indicate the occurrence of a first-order phase transition, and such systemic risk failures need to be 
considered in the future by policymakers in conjunction with SC risk management strategies to improve system 
resilience. With respect to the lower bound parameter, i.e., cost per output, the system is more robust under power law 
distributions than uniform distributions, for the studied scenarios.  
Introduction 
In the competitive economic market, SC entities often build business relationships with outsourcing partners to 
reduce the overall cost and promote productivity. As a result, SCs have become more complicated and geographically 
dispersed, increasing the frequencies of SC disruptions1. Due to the increased dependencies among entities, disruptions 
of a company’s operation can result in revenue losses in its business partners, and cascade to other components in the 
SC, leading to a ripple effect2. On the other hand, in recent years, sustainability concerns have pushed for higher 
efficiency in the use of resources and reduction in protective redundancies in SCs, thus making SCs more susceptible 
to disruptions3. For example, since Australia food SC entities had reduced inventories to expedite the production cycle, 
it was difficult for them to restock during the Victorian bushfire disaster in 20094,5. Natural disasters, intentional 
attacks, and economic recessions can cause significant financial losses, and even market share decrease to the SC 
entities due to delays in the flow of goods6. During the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami, Toyota Motor Company 
suffered at least a 140,000-vehicle production loss. This adverse effect spread to other countries including the UK and 
the US, which led to a massive collapse in the global automotive and electronics industry7. In the following weeks 
after the disaster, Toyota in North America experienced shortages of over 150 parts, resulting in curtailed operations 
at only 30% of capacity8. In light of these low probability and high impact disruptions, SC resilience has been the 
subject of many recent studies.  
Many works have focused on developing risk management strategies to plan for catastrophic events, increase chain 
agility, and mitigate risks against SC disruptions7,9,10. Several studies have analyzed the SC cascading failure process 
utilizing complex network theory. Tang et al.11 examined the robustness of an interdependent SC network model, 
which consists of an undirected cyber layer and a directed physical layer, subject to different node removal strategies. 
However, failures are overload-driven in this cascading failure model, like most other models built for smart grids, in 
which power flows exceeding the line capacity can cause power outages11,12. Thus, it may not appropriately reflect the 
nature of cascading failures in SC systems, which are mostly underload-driven. When entities cannot fulfill the 
expected production requirement to overcome the fixed production costs, they will fail to gain profit and possibly exit 
the market. Tang et al.13 assessed the SC system robustness in the form of production capability losses, but it assumed 
that the failed node loads only propagate downstream, and entities fail without mitigation strategies. Wang et al. 
attempted to improve the cluster SC network resilience against cascading failures, leveraging insights from the ant 
colony’s spatial fidelity zones14. In the model developed by Wang et al., a node can propagate the failure impact both 
upstream and downstream, and can dynamically change the strength of the business relationship with its neighbors15. 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are few works considering underload-driven failures, and most current 
2 
 
studies analyze the SC system robustness through numerical simulations without a focus on the phase transition 
behavior by incorporating network flows. 
Given the tremendous damages caused by the disruptions, understanding the nature of the systemic failure in SC 
that goes beyond a single component behavior is a significant problem to be addressed. In this paper, we investigate 
if an abrupt breakdown would emerge in SC systems against underload cascading failures. First, we will build a 
generalized underload cascade failure model and test the system behavior under scenarios of load decrease and load 
fluctuations. Entities are modeled as network nodes, and links refer to the supply-demand relationships between the 
entities. The material flow of goods through an entity node defines its load. When a node is disrupted, its downstream 
and upstream neighbors will be affected due to supply shortage and demand losses respectively. If the neighbor node’s 
remaining load drops below the lower bound constraint, i.e., cost, new failure occurs and cascades to other nodes in 
the entire system. Second, we will provide analytic results based on the assumption of equal load redistribution upon 
failures. The goal of our work is to shed light on the qualitative behavior of real-world SC systems that policymakers 
can consider to avoid risks of systemic failure.  
The contributions of this paper are: (i) We found numerically and analytically the first-order phase transition of 
the SC model under a load decrease scenario. In percolation theory, based on statistical physics, this indicates that a 
small fraction of failures can result in a sudden breakdown in the SC system. (ii) The system is relatively robust against 
load fluctuations, and we verify that strategies of backup suppliers and surplus inventories often adopted by SC 
managers to mitigate losses can also improve the system robustness from a systemic failure perspective. (iii) Regarding 
different distributions of the lower bound load parameter, reflecting cost per output, the underload cascading failure 
model is more robust under the power-law distribution case than the uniform distribution case, for the studied scenarios. 
These findings indicate that disruptive events such as load decrease can have catastrophic impacts to the system, and 
the systemic failure risks need to be considered by SC decision-makers in conjunction with the current SC risk 
management strategies. 
Model formulation 
Underload cascading failure model. In this paper, we model SCs as weighted directed networks, in which nodes are 
entities and edges denote the business relationships between the entities. Featured with multi-hierarchy, enterprises in 
SC networks are both demand-side and supply-side, while nodes in the same tier have similar network connections, 
core businesses, and competitive environments16–18. Therefore, nodes in the same category generally compete for 
upstream suppliers and downstream clients. Due to the absence of empirical data sets, we generate synthetic networks 
for a four-tier SC network, i.e., suppliers, production centers, distribution centers, and customers. N nodes are 
generated and equally divided into four tiers, in which one enterprise belongs only to one layer. Links are created 
randomly with a given connection probability p, which is the likelihood of existing business relationships between 
nodes in two tiers. Additional efforts are made to ensure the network created is without self-loops. Despite the random 
placement of links, most nodes will have approximately the same number of connections in the generated system. For 
example, the average node outdegree of a network with 100 nodes in each tier (N=400) and p=0.1 will be around 10.  
The cascading failure processes with and without recovery measures are shown as flowcharts in Fig. 1 with the 
following steps. Step 0: After model initialization, we uniformly decrease or fluctuate the initial loads to simulate the 
initial failures. Step 1: These newly failed nodes affect their upstream and downstream neighbors throughout the 
system, and all loads and flows affected are updated. Step 2: With recovery measures, the nodes affected can mitigate 
losses by altering flows with existing partners or building new partners. Then, if there are still nodes with load below 
their lower bound load, new failure occurs and continue the process from Step 1–2. Such a procedure is repeated until 
no new failure happens.  
More specifically, in the model initialization, we set up the initial loads and load constraints of the nodes in the 
network. The sum of material flows that goes through an entity node defines its load 𝐿 (𝑡−1), i.e., the total number of 
products that an enterprise has sold per time unit. The total number of products an enterprise currently has, i.e., 
inventory, defines its upper bound load, 𝐴𝑖. In normal condition, an enterprise’s load should be above the lower limit 
load, 𝐵𝑖 , to make a profit and survive the competitive market. Each node i has a specific 𝐴𝑖  and 𝐵𝑖 , which are 
proportional to the initial load 𝐿𝑖(0), and are given by 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑎𝐿𝑖(0) (𝑎 > 1) and 𝐵𝑖 = 𝑏𝐿𝑖(0) (0 < 𝑏 < 1), where a 
and b are tolerance parameters. 
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In the load propagation process, the impact of failed nodes spreads to the entire system. For example, in Fig. 2, 
when node 9 and 13 fail at time t, the loads of the failed nodes first propagate to their neighbor nodes 4, 14, 15 and 8, 
18 through connectivity links. Then, these affected nodes 14, 15 further impact their downstream nodes 18, 19 and 20 
by reducing supply. Meanwhile, node 8 influences its upstream neighbor nodes 2, 3 and 4 by cutting back demand. 
In the recovery process, the nodes, which have not been marked as failed, can recover their loads by requesting 
rush orders or building new business partnerships. To mitigate losses, node i will first select from the alive nodes in 
its upstream neighbor set Γ𝑖
𝑈 and downstream neighbor set Γ𝑖
𝐷. If all the neighbor nodes still cannot help it recover 
above 𝐵𝑖 , node i will build links with alive nodes in its upstream non-neighbor set Γ̅𝑖
𝑈(𝑡) and downstream non-
neighbor set Γ̅𝑖
𝐷(𝑡).  
Note that, while in this paper we conduct numerical simulations on a four-tier SC network, the underload cascading 
process is independent of the network topologies, and can be applied to other types of SC networks. More details can 
be found in Methods.                          
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Figure 1. Flowcharts for the cascading failure process. Given the initial loads for nodes in tier 4, we calculate the 
initial loads 𝐿𝑖(0) and load constraints for all the nodes, and the initial flows on the links. Keeping the load constraints 
for all nodes unchanged, we decrease or fluctuate all the initial loads. The new initial load of node i is 𝐿𝑖
′ (0). If node 
i fails at time t, i.e., 𝐿𝑖(𝑡) < 𝐵𝑖 , its load and all the flows through node i become 0. The new failure propagates 
throughout the system, and all the loads and flows affected get updated. With recovery measures, nodes can mitigate 
the losses by altering flows with other nodes under the upper bound load constraint 𝐴𝑖 (see Methods). Such a procedure 
is repeated until no new failure happens. 
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Figure 2. Failed node load propagation in a four-tier supply chain. Red circles represent the initial failures caused 
by load decrease or fluctuations. When nodes 9 and 13 fail, the failure can propagate to their neighbor set 4, 14, 15, 
and set 8, 18 respectively. Meanwhile, the affected node load will further spread to other nodes in tier 1 and 4 such 
as nodes 2 and 20.  
Notations. The notations frequently used in this study are summarized as follows. 
𝐴𝑖  Upper bound load of node 𝑖, i.e., inventory 
𝐵𝑖  Lower bound load of node 𝑖, i.e., costs 
𝑎 Upper bound parameter associated with 𝐴𝑖 
𝑏 Lower bound parameter associated with 𝐵𝑖 , reflecting cost per output 
[𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥] Range of lower bound parameter 𝑏 
𝐿𝑖(𝑡) Load of node 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
𝐿𝑖
′ (0) New initial load of node 𝑖 under load decrease/fluctuation scenario 
Δ𝐿𝑖(𝑡) Absolute value of load loss of node i at time 𝑡, which equals 𝐿𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐿𝑖(𝑡 − 1) 
𝜓𝑖(𝑡) Load increase of node i at time 𝑡 during the recovery process 
𝑅𝐿𝑖(𝑡) Residual load of node i at time 𝑡, which equals 𝐴𝑖 − 𝐿𝑖(𝑡), i.e., surplus inventory 
𝐹𝑖𝑗(𝑡) Flow on edge 𝑒𝑖𝑗 between nodes 𝑖, 𝑗 
Γ𝑖
𝑈(𝑡) Set of upstream nodes connected to node 𝑖, i.e., upstream neighbor set of node 𝑖 
Γ𝑖
𝐷(𝑡) Set of downstream nodes connected to node 𝑖, i.e., downstream neighbor set of node 𝑖 
Γ̅𝑖
𝑈(𝑡) Set of upstream nodes not connected to node 𝑖, i.e., upstream non-neighbor set of node 𝑖 
Γ̅𝑖
𝐷(𝑡) Set of downstream nodes not connected to node 𝑖, i.e., downstream non-neighbor set of node 𝑖  
𝛿 Strength of load decrease 
𝜎 Strength of load fluctuation, i.e., variation size  
𝑁 Total number of nodes in the network 
𝑝 Connection probability that a node connects to the nodes in the downstream tier 
f The fraction of failed nodes in the end 
𝑓𝑡 The fraction of failed nodes until time 𝑡 in the mean-field model 
𝑁𝑡 The number of surviving nodes until time 𝑡 in the mean-field model 
?̅?𝑡     Load of each node at time 𝑡 in the mean-field model 
?̅?0
′  New initial load of each node under load decrease in the mean-field model 
Table 1. Notations. 
Results  
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Researchers often study the phase transition behavior exhibited by the system through stressing external forces to 
it until the rupture point19. In this work, we examine the system behavior of a four-tier SC network under stress of 
load decrease and fluctuations. Trade between SC entities often happen periodically, and goods need time to be 
transported to the buyer20. Accordingly, entities usually may not be able to adjust business relationships with others, 
or switch to another supplier to purchase products in time under disruptive events.  
Numerical simulations are conducted using Java programming following the cascading failure process in Fig.1. 
Note that each node’s load constraints, 𝐴𝑖  and 𝐵𝑖 , remained fixed as 𝛿  or 𝜎  changes under each scenario. More 
specifically, as the failures are underload-driven, we conduct extensive simulations with different distributions of 
lower bound parameter b (Fig. 3). Two commonly used families of distributions are considered: (i) Uniform and (ii) 
Power-law distribution21,22, in which uniform distribution provides an intuitive baseline.  
Uniformly distributed over [𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥], denoted by U[𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥], the probability density function for a random 
variable b is given by 
𝑝(𝑏) =
1
𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑛
∙ 1𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑛≤𝑏≤𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥                                                                  (1) 
Following a power-law distribution, the probability density function for a random variable b is of the form  
𝑝(𝑏) = 𝑘 ∙ (𝑏)−𝛾 with 𝑏 ∈ [𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 1]                                                             (2) 
      
(a) Histogram of b uniformly distributed over [0.2, 0.7]                    b) Histogram of 𝑏 when 𝑝(𝑏) ∝ (𝑏)−2                                                               
Figure 3. Examples of lower bound parameter distributions.  
Load decrease. In this scenario, we consider a negative demand shock, in which demand for goods or services 
shrinkages suddenly. It is not far away from reality; for instance, the 2008 financial crisis led to a drop in consumer 
spending, thus production decreased and companies went bankrupt in SCs throughout23. Due to uncertain trade policy 
environments, exports of US soya beans to China dropped by 50% in 2018, which is predicted to have a broader 
impact both within nations and globally24.  
To model the load decrease scenario, we simultaneously decrease the initial loads for all nodes in tier 4 by a factor 
𝛿, i.e., 𝐿𝑖
′ (0) = (1 − 𝛿)𝐿𝑖(0). Then, we calculate flows and loads for all nodes in tiers 1–3, following the model 
initialization procedure. Keeping the network topology unchanged, it is equivalent to a uniform decrease of all nodes 
by a factor 𝛿. In each realization, 𝛿 changes from 0 to 1 with a step size of 0.02. We record the fraction of failed nodes 
f at the end of the simulation, and the results are averaged over 100 realizations for each network configuration.  
As shown in Fig. 4, there is a discontinuous phase transition in all cases. When there are no recovery measures 
and b is uniformly distributed over [𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥], we found a sharp collapse of the system in Fig. 4a–c. More 
specifically, the critical point above which failure occurs is only determined by 𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥 , the upper limit of the uniform 
distribution. For example, in Fig. 4b, in which 𝐵𝑖  ranges between [0.2𝐿𝑖(0), 0.7𝐿𝑖(0)], when 𝛿 > 0.3, i.e., 𝐿𝑖
′ (0) <
0.7𝐿𝑖(0), initial failures start to appear. These initial failures will propagate throughout the system and result in system 
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collapse. In other words, initial failures when no mitigation strategies are adopted, can result in a sudden breakdown 
of the system. 
Then, we include recovery measures to each case and conduct experiments with different values of the upper 
bound parameter, a. Results show that the recovery strategy can reduce the scale of systemic failure, and higher surplus 
inventory yields a smaller fraction of failed nodes. This is because the reconfiguration of the trade flows among alive 
nodes can absorb losses of nodes affected by the initial failures. In Fig. 4b, when 𝛿 > 0.8, i.e., 𝐿𝑖
′ (0) < 0.2𝐿𝑖(0), all 
the loads fail at the beginning and are marked as failed, so they will not mitigate losses under the recovery process.  
With b in the form of power distribution, the system collapses when 𝛿 increases to 0.88 without recovery process. 
Compared to the uniform distribution case, most b values are relatively small (see Fig. 3b), and the system becomes 
more robust. With recovery measures, we observe almost no difference for the system behavior under different values 
of a. This is because the surplus inventory, 0.2𝐿𝑖(0), can absorb the losses of the new affected nodes.  
  
(a) 𝑏 ∈ 𝑈[0, 0.7]                                                             (b) 𝑏 ∈ 𝑈[0.2, 0.7]                      
 
(c) 𝑏 ∈ 𝑈[0, 0.5]                                                                 (d) 𝑝(𝑏) ∝ 𝑏−2 with b ∈ [0.02, 1]                                     
Figure 4. Effects of load decrease. Plots of the fraction of failed nodes f versus the relative load decrease 𝛿 mimicking 
the demand shock. Results are averaged over 100 realizations with network size N=400 and connection probability 
p=0.1. Our results show a sudden breakdown of the system, and mitigation strategies can enhance system robustness. 
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Load fluctuations. We mimic the load fluctuations by setting final customers’ initial load as 𝐿𝑖
′ (0) =
(1 + 𝜎 𝜉𝑖)𝐿𝑖(0), i.e., 𝐿𝑖
′ (0) ∈ [(1 − 𝜎)𝐿𝑖(0), (1 + 𝜎)𝐿𝑖(0)], where 𝜉𝑖 is a random variable uniformly distributed in 
[-1, 1]. Then, we calculate the new initial loads for the nodes in tier 1–3 and flows on the edges. It is equivalent to 
allowing all the initial loads to fluctuate by a fraction of 𝜎. To ensure 𝐿𝑖
′ (0) < 𝐴𝑖, with 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑎𝐿𝑖(0), upper bound 
parameter 𝑎 is set to be two, when 𝜎 varies between [0, 1]. Results are averaged over 100 runs of the simulation.  
Fig. 5 shows the changes in the fraction of failed nodes as variation size σ increases. Compared with the load 
decrease scenario, the system collapse happens less abruptly. When b is uniformly distributed over [0, 0.9], the 
fraction of failed nodes reaches a plateau of around 75% as fluctuation escalates. In comparison, when b is uniformly 
distributed over [0, 0.8], about 20% of nodes failed in the end, suggesting that the system is relatively robust. Recall 
that 𝑏 reflect the cost per output. Results indicate that increasing homogeneity regarding the low cost per output in SC 
entities may help improve the system robustness against fluctuations.  
 
Figure 5. Effects of load fluctuations. A plot of the fraction of failed nodes versus the relative strength of load 
fluctuations 𝜎. Results are averaged over 100 realizations with network size N=400 and connection probability p=0.1. 
The results indicate that the SC network is more robust under load fluctuations compared to the load decrease scenario.  
 
Mean-field analysis. Next, we forecast a first-order transition in the SC system in the mean-field sense. SC disruptions 
can propagate throughout the system due to the long-chain feature, which is similar to the redistribution of power 
flows in the whole system upon failures according to the long-range nature of Kirchhoff’s law. This feature inspires 
us to leverage the equal load redistribution model that has been used in power systems21. The assumption is that when 
a node fails, the load it carries before the failure will be redistributed equally among all the remaining nodes.  
To obtain the fraction of failed nodes, we provide analytic solutions by numerically solving Eq. 9 and verify them 
by iterating the algorithm in Fig. 8. We assume the initial node load ?̅?0 = 1 before the disruptions, and thus lower 
bound load 𝐵𝑖 = 𝑏?̅?0 = 𝑏 ∙ 1 with 𝑏 ∈ [𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥]. Under disruption of load decrease, the initial load becomes ?̅?0
′ =
(1 − 𝛿)?̅?0 = (1 − 𝛿) ∙ 1. From Fig. 6, we observe a first-order phase transition in all cases. In the uniform distribution 
case, the critical point below which a sudden collapse happens is only determined by 𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥 , the upper constraint of the 
uniform distribution. When the new initial load ?̅?0
′  is above 𝐵𝑖 , there are no failures in the system. Once ?̅?0
′  falls below 
𝐵𝑖 , the system collapses because the fraction of failed node obtained from the equation will increase to 1. When 𝑏 
follows a power-law distribution, the system is more robust, and there is an abrupt breakdown of the system around  
𝛿 ≈ 0.9. Interestingly, this is contrary of the mean-field result for the overload cascade model22, in which the first-
order jump happens with no precursors in power-law distributions, and with precursors in line capacity following a 
uniform distribution. This indicates that the scale of cascade failures in SCs could be significantly affected by the 
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shape of the 𝑏 distribution. Since 𝑏 = 𝐵/?̅?0 is related to a company’s cost, we can conclude that the system with 
entities of similar low cost per output are more robust to SC disruptions, compared to the one with various cost. 
 
(a) 𝑏 ∈ 𝑈[0, 0.7]                                                                 (b) 𝑏 ∈ 𝑈[0.2, 0.7] 
 
                (c) 𝑏 ∈ 𝑈[0, 0.5]                                                 d) 𝑝(𝑏) ∝ (𝑏)−2 with b ∈ [0.02, 1]                                                
Figure 6. Mean-field results. Plots of the fraction of failed nodes f as a function of the relative load decrease 𝛿. The 
results obtained from the algorithm are average over 100 runs of simulation. As 𝛿 continues to increase, all the nodes 
in the network will eventually fail. Regarding the lower bound parameter, 𝑏, the system is more robust under power-
law distributions than uniform distributions.  
Discussion 
In this paper, we constructed a four-tier SC system and explored its emergent behavior against underload cascading 
failures. When disruption occurs, the node with load below the lower bound fails, and propagates its failed node load 
to its upstream and downstream neighbors. The model proposed exhibits a first-order phase transition behavior under 
load decrease scenario as predicted by mean-field analysis. More specifically, under different distributions of lower 
bound parameter b, i.e., cost per output, the system is more robust when b follows a power distribution compared to 
the uniform distribution, for the studied scenario. The results suggest that increasing homogeneity regarding low cost 
per output of SC entities would help reduce the possibility of a systemic failure.  
The system is more robust against load fluctuations than load decrease. In the load fluctuation scenario, the 
discontinuous transition occurs only when variation size 𝜎 is very high, which may rarely happen in reality. The 
emergent behaviors observed from the underload-driven model proposed in this work is different from the analytic 
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results derived from the overload-driven system by Pahwa et al.22, in which power-law distribution of capacity results 
in a more abrupt system breakdown.  
Besides, we include recovery strategies to the cascading failure process, and the simulation results show that 
surplus inventory and backup suppliers can significantly reduce the scale of the systemic failure when disruptive 
events happen. Therefore, it is essential to consider a systemic risk perspective of the SC in conjunction with the 
managerial decision making aspects of risk mitigation25. Since SC networks are more vulnerable against disruptive 
events such as load decrease, i.e., demand shock, than load fluctuations, it is crucial for policymakers to pay attention 
to these events and maintain a stable trade environment. Besides, the discontinuous phase transition behavior of the 
system indicates it is hard to predict a catastrophic failure in SCs, and thus SC entity decision makers need to take 
proactive protection measures to avoid the impact of a demand shock.  
As SCs grow globally, systemic risk analysis of the SCs needs further exploration. In this paper, we qualitatively 
show the dynamic behavior of SCs against disruptions and do not take the whole complexity of SCs into account. For 
example, the four-tier SC model we built disregards the possibility of a business relationship which crosses the tiers, 
e.g., tier 1 and 3, and the possible internal connections between entities in the same tier. It also did not reflect dynamic 
entry and exit mechanisms of node enterprises in SCs, in which weaker enterprises may be eliminated and replaced 
by new members. Future work can incorporate these features into the current model and analyze the system behavior 
under disruptive events. Although many SC networks are found to follow power-law distributions26–28, exceptions 
exist29 and there is no consensus on the SC network topologies. Besides, since the links in the SC network are randomly 
generated based on a connection probability and we disrupt all nodes with a factor 𝛿 or 𝜎, the initial failures triggered 
in this work can be seen as caused by random attacks. More simulations can be conducted to examine the phase 
transition behavior of SC systems under targeted attack with various network topologies. In this work, we mainly 
focus on the discovery of a phase transition, thus designing an optimal recovery strategy is not our primary focus. The 
recovery process developed assumes that SC entities have full knowledge of the surplus inventory information in the 
whole system, and future work can include more realistic assumptions regarding mitigation strategies.   
Methods 
Underload cascading failure process. In a SC network, the load on a node is defined as the material flowing through 
the node per time unit. The initial load on a node i, denoted as 𝐿𝑖(0), varies between the lower bound load 𝐵𝑖  and 
upper bound load 𝐴𝑖. More specifically, 𝐴𝑖, representing a firm’s inventory, is given by 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑎𝐿𝑖(0), where 𝑎 is the 
upper bound parameter, 𝑎 > 1. Reflecting costs such as labor cost and maintenance fee, 𝐵𝑖  is calculated by 𝐵𝑖 =
𝑏𝐿𝑖(0), with 𝑏 denoting the lower bound parameter, 0 < 𝑏 < 1. Residual load of a node 𝑖 at time t, given by 𝑅𝐿𝑖(𝑡) =
𝐴𝑖 − 𝐿𝑖(𝑡), indicates the additional available products an entity can provide, i.e., surplus inventory. We assume a node 
fails if its load 𝐿𝑖(𝑡) falls below 𝐵𝑖 , meaning that the entity fails to gain profit and survive in the competitive market.  
According to the definition of node load, the sum of incoming flows always equals the sum of outgoing flows for 
each node i, i.e., ∑ 𝐹𝑖𝑗(𝑡) =𝑗𝜖Γ𝑖
𝐷(𝑡) ∑ 𝐹𝑗𝑖(𝑡)𝑗𝜖Γ𝑖
𝑈(𝑡) , with demand and supply balanced. We utilize a four-tier network as 
an example and illustrate the cascading failure process as follows. 
Step 0: Model initialization. In this step, we first calculate the node degree for all nodes and weight on all edges. 
Node degree of node 𝑖  is the sum of its indegree 𝑑𝑖
+  and outdegree 𝑑𝑖
− , i.e. 𝑑𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖
+ + 𝑑𝑖
− . Consistent with 
reference14,15, weight on 𝑒𝑖𝑗 reflects the business relationship strength between node 𝑖 and 𝑗, and is calculated by 𝑤𝑖𝑗 =
(𝑑𝑖 ∙ 𝑑𝑗)
𝜃, with 𝜃 = 0.5. 
Then, we compute the initial flows and node loads in the network. Suppose the initial loads for nodes in tier 4, 
equivalent to the demand for final customers, are known and equal. We rescale the weight on incoming edges of node 
j such that new weights on incoming edges of node j sums to 1, i.e., ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
′
𝑖∈Γ𝑗
𝑈 =1:  
𝑤𝑖𝑗
′ =
𝑤𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑗𝑘∈Γ𝑗
𝑈⁄                                                                                (3) 
where ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑗𝑘∈Γ𝑗
𝑈  is the sum of weights on incoming edges of node 𝑗.  
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Given node loads in tier 4, 𝐿𝑗(0), we calculate the initial flow over 𝑒𝑖𝑗 between tier 3 and 4 by  
𝐹𝑖𝑗(0) = 𝑤𝑖𝑗
′ ∙ 𝐿𝑗(0)                                                                                   (4) 
Accordingly, the load of node i in tier 3 is the sum of the outgoing flows of node i 
𝐿𝑖(0) = ∑ 𝐹𝑖𝑘(0)𝑘𝜖Γ𝑖
𝐷                                                                                    (5)  
Following the same method, we sequentially calculate the initial loads of nodes in tier 2 and 1. After the 
determination of all nodes’ initial loads, we calculate the load constraints 𝐴𝑖 and 𝐵𝑖  of each node. 
Step 1: Failed node load propagation. We assume that when a node fails, it can neither receive supplies from 
upstream neighbors, nor ship products to its downstream partners. Once a node 𝑖 fails at time t, both its load and the 
flows on its incoming and outgoing edges are set to 0. The impact of failed node i propagates upstream using Eq. 6. 
In the first propagation, we calculate the loss of each node j in its upstream neighbor set, Γ𝑖
𝑈, suffers at time t, i.e., 
∆𝐿𝑗(𝑡), and update the corresponding loads and flows. Meanwhile, in the second propagation, affected nodes j further 
impact nodes k in its upstream neighbor set, Γ𝑗
𝑈 using Eq. 7. 
{
 
 
 
 ∆𝐿𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐿𝑖(𝑡 − 1)
𝐹𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1)
∑ 𝐹𝑚𝑖(𝑡−1)𝑚𝜖Γ𝑖
𝑈
𝐿𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐿𝑗(𝑡 − 1) − ∆𝐿𝑗(𝑡)            
𝐹𝑗𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐹𝑗𝑖(𝑡 − 1) − ∆𝐿𝑗(𝑡)           
                                                             (6) 
{
 
 
 
 ∆𝐿𝑘(𝑡) = ∆𝐿𝑗(𝑡)
𝐹𝑘𝑗(𝑡−1)
∑ 𝐹𝑚𝑗(𝑡−1)𝑚𝜖Γ𝑗
𝑈
      
𝐿𝑘(𝑡) = 𝐿𝑘(𝑡 − 1) − ∆𝐿𝑘(𝑡)           
𝐹𝑘𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐹𝑘𝑗(𝑡 − 1) − ∆𝐿𝑘(𝑡)         
                                                             (7)      
Similarly, we update the loads and flows for each node j in Γ𝑖
𝐷 and then the downstream neighbor nodes of node j.  
This process continues to tier 1 and 4, mimicking the ripple effect spreading throughout the system.                                                                                        
Step 2: Load recovery process. Facing changes in the external environment, entities can request rush orders with 
existing partners or develop new partners to mitigate losses14. Since acquiring new partners will bring additional costs, 
we assume a node would first recover its load by selecting from the surviving nodes in its neighbor sets, Γ𝑖
𝑈 and Γ𝑖
𝐷. 
Only if all the neighbor nodes cannot help it recover above 𝐵𝑖 , the node will build links with alive nodes in its non-
neighbor sets, Γ̅𝑖
𝑈(𝑡) and Γ̅𝑖
𝐷(𝑡).  
In this work, we design a recovery process to maximize the resource allocation, while satisfying that (i) each node 
at most provides its residual, i.e., 𝐿𝑖(𝑡) < 𝐴𝑖(𝑡), and (ii) flows are balanced for each node. To imitate that node i 
requests rush orders from downstream neighbor node j in Γ𝑖
𝐷, we update the outgoing flow of node i and loads of both 
nodes with the same increase, 𝜓𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜓𝑗(𝑡). Meanwhile, node i needs to reconfigure its incoming flows with its 
neighbor nodes in Γ𝑖
𝑈 to balance its supply and demand. As a result, the sum of load increase, ∑ 𝜓𝑖(𝑡)𝑖∈𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑠  in each 
tier s are equal. On the other hand, since the number of surviving nodes, which are eligible to recover, is not necessarily 
the same for each tier, load loss ∑ (𝐿𝑖
′ (0) − 𝐿𝑖(𝑡))𝑖∈𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑠  of all the surviving nodes in each tier can be different. 
Similarly, the sum of residual load for nodes in each tier s, ∑ 𝑅𝐿𝑖(𝑡)𝑖∈𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑠 , may be different.  
Therefore, we need to identify tier TierA with the most loss ∑ (𝐿𝑖
′ (0) − 𝐿𝑖(𝑡))𝑖∈𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑠 , i.e., ∆𝐿𝑀𝐴𝑋 , and tier TierB 
with the minimum ∑ 𝑅𝐿𝑖(𝑡)𝑖∈𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑠 , called R𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑁 (Eq. 8). In each tier, the load increase 𝜓𝑖(𝑡) allocated to each node 
should sum up to the minimum value of 𝑅𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑁 and ∆𝐿𝑀𝐴𝑋, the tier of which is defined as minTier. Once each tier 
reaches the load increase objective 𝑄 = ∑ 𝜓𝑖(𝑡)𝑖∈𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑠 , the recovery process stops.  
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{
𝑅𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑁 = ∑ 𝑅𝐿𝑖(𝑡)𝑖𝜖𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝐴                         
∆𝐿𝑀𝐴𝑋 = ∑ (𝐿𝑖
′ (0) − 𝐿𝑖(𝑡))𝑖∈𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝐵        
∑ 𝜓𝑖(𝑡)𝑖∈𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑠 = min(𝑅𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑁 , ∆𝐿𝑀𝐴𝑋)
                                                           (8) 
For implementation, we construct two recursive functions, i.e., askSupplier and askNonSupplier, to increase the 
load upstream in Fig 7. First, we allocate load increase 𝑄 to the nodes in minTier tier. Then, the node i in minTier, 
who get their load increased, 𝜓𝑖(𝑡), distributes the load to its suppliers in Γ𝑖
𝑈. Note that the total load increase of nodes 
in Γ𝑖
𝑈 should equal 𝜓𝑖(𝑡). If the first selected supplier j’s 𝑅𝐿𝑗(𝑡) cannot satisfy node i’s request, node i will continue 
to ask from the next supplier in Γ𝑖
𝑈. If ∑ 𝜓𝑗(𝑡)𝑗∈Γ𝑖
𝑈 < 𝜓𝑖(𝑡), node i will call askNonSupplier function to build links 
with nodes in non-neighbor set Γ̅𝑖
𝑈(𝑡), until objective 𝜓𝑖(𝑡) is met. This process continues until all related suppliers 
in tier 1 have increased their loads. Similarly, we use askCustomer and askNonCustomer functions to update the loads 
of nodes downstream.  
 Input: nodes in all tiers 
1 Find the tier with 𝑅𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑁 for surviving nodes, and save the index to TierA 
2 Find the tier with ∆𝐿𝑀𝐴𝑋 for surviving nodes, and save the index to TierB 
3 if (R𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑁 >=∆𝐿𝑀𝐴𝑋)  
4                     Q ⟵ ∆𝐿𝑀𝐴𝑋 
5                     minTier ⟵ TierA  
6                     flag ⟵ 0 
7 else  
8                    Q ⟵ R𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑁 
9                    minTier ⟵ TierB 
10                    flag ⟵ 1 
11 end if 
12 for each node in the unfailed node set of minTier 
13                    if (flag==0)                       
14                                    Req ⟵ node.deltL;                          //𝐿𝑖
′ (0) − 𝐿𝑖(𝑡) 
15                    else  
16                                    Req ⟵ node.residual; 
17                    end if 
18                    if (Req != 0) 
19                                    Q ⟵ Q-Req; 
20                                    node.load ⟵ node.load+ Req;      
21                                    node.residual ⟵ node.residual-Req;    
22                                    LoadLeft ⟵ node.askSupplier(this, Req); 
23                                    if (LoadLeft!= 0)                  
24                                                      node. askNonSupplier (this, LoadLeft) 
25                                    end if 
26                               LoadLeft ⟵ node. askCustomer (this, Req); 
27                                    if  (LoadLeft!=0) {  //build new links with other surviving nodes           
28                                                      node. askNonCustomer(this, LoadLeft); 
29                                    end if 
30                    end if 
31                    if (Q ==0)       
32                                     break; 
33                    end if 
34 end for 
Figure 7. Algorithm for the recovery process 
Mean-field analysis. The effects of SC disruptions can spread to the entire system, which has some common 
characteristics with the long-range nature of cascading failures in power systems. The reconfiguration of the material 
flows in the SC system is dependent on the business relationships among entities, like the impedance of the power 
lines. Initially, after a disruption, some nodes could get underloaded and fail, i.e., the first stage of the cascade failure 
process. The first stage could result in more failures, constituting the second stage and so on. The system goes through 
multiple times of cascades until no new failures occur.  
The wide-range interactions of SC disruption propagation allow us to use a mean-field analysis. Here, we adopted 
the equal load redistribution model that has been widely used in power systems21,22,30. The equal load redistribution 
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assumption is originated from the widely used democratic fiber bundle model31, in which N parallel fibers with 
different failure capacity share an applied force equally. In the following, we analyze the load decrease scenario using 
a simple equal-load redistribution model to predict a first-order phase transition. 
We consider N nodes with a lower bound load 𝐵𝑖  characterized by a probability distribution 𝑝(𝐵). Suppose failures 
happen in discrete time steps t=0, 1, …. The fraction of failed nodes and the number of surviving nodes until cascade 
stage t is denoted as 𝑓𝑡 and 𝑁𝑡 respectively. When the load of a node goes below 𝐵𝑖, the node fails and its load gets 
redistributed equally among the remaining surviving nodes. For simplicity, we did not consider the upper bound load 
𝐴, and only focus on the threshold of the failure 𝐵𝑖  in the mean-field analysis.      
There is no failure before the disruptions, thus 𝑓0 = 0 and 𝑁0 = 𝑁. Under disruptions, we assume all the nodes 
initially carried the same load ?̅?0
′ .  In the mean-field sense, a fraction of nodes 𝑓1 = ∫ 𝑝(𝐵)𝑑𝐵
∞
?̅?0
′  immediately fails, 
since their load ?̅?0
′  is below the lower bound load. After the first stage, the number of surviving nodes equals to 𝑁1 =
(1 − 𝑓1)𝑁 , and the new load per node becomes ?̅?1 = ?̅?0
′ −
𝑓1?̅?0
′𝑁
(1−𝑓1)𝑁
= (1 −
𝑓1
1−𝑓1
) ?̅?0
′ . The cascade failure process 
continues recursively, and the mean-field equations for the (𝑡 + 1)𝑡ℎ stage are as follows: 
{
 
 𝑓𝑡+1 = ∫ 𝑝
(𝐵)𝑑𝐵
∞
?̅?𝑡
                                               
𝑁𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝑓𝑡+1)𝑁                                              
?̅?𝑡+1 = ?̅?𝑡 −
(𝑓𝑡+1𝑁−𝑓𝑡𝑁)?̅?𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
= (1 −
𝑓𝑡+1−𝑓𝑡
1−𝑓𝑡+1
) ?̅?𝑡
                                                   (9) 
where 
𝑓𝑡+1𝑁−𝑓𝑡𝑁
𝑁𝑡+1
 is 
Number of lines that survive stage 𝑡 but fail at 𝑡+1
Number of lines that survive stage 𝑡+1
.  
Eq. 9 can be simplified as  
       
𝑓𝑡+1 = 𝐹(?̅?0
′ ∏(1−
𝑓𝑡 − 𝑓𝑡−1
1 − 𝑓𝑡
𝑡
𝑡=1
)) 
                                                             (10)        
where 𝐹(𝑥) = ∫ 𝑝(𝐵)𝑑𝐵
∞
𝑥
. 
 Input: number of nodes N; initial load per node ?̅?0
′                 
 Output: fraction of failed nodes f 
1 Create a new ArrayList of M nodes nodeSet 
2 for each node m in nodeSet            
3                    m.𝐵 ⟵ a random variable 𝑏 following probability distribution 𝑝(𝑏) 
4                    m.load ⟵ ?̅?0
′                 
5 end for 
6 Create a null ArrayList of nodes called failnodeSet 
7 while (nodeSet.size() != 0){ 
8            loadReduce ⟵ 0 
9            for each node m in nodeSet 
10                        if (m.load < m.𝐵)  
11                                    loadReduce ⟵ loadReduce +m.load; 
12                                    failnodes.add(m); 
13                         end if 
14            end for 
15            if (loadReduce==0)   
16                          break; 
17            end if 
18            nodeSet.removeAll(failnodeSet) 
19            for each node m in nodeSet 
20                         m.load ⟵ m. load- Math.min(m.load, loadReduce/nodes.size()); 
21            end for 
22 end while 
23 Return       f ⟵ (N-nodes.size())/N 
Figure 8. Algorithm for the mean-field model under load decrease scenario 
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From Eq. 10, we can see that the critical point 𝑓∗  is mainly dependent on the distribution of 𝐵𝑖 . Before the 
disruption, we assume the initial node load ?̅?0 = 1, and thus 𝐵𝑖 = 𝑏?̅?0 = 𝑏 ∙ 1. To examine the effects of distributions, 
we compare the results under uniform distribution and power distribution of b by numerically solving Eq. 9. The 
fraction of failed nodes is also calculated through iterating the algorithm in Fig. 8, and both methods yield the same 
results. 
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